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1 INTRODUCTION
Practically every country that is exposed to business cycles has adopted
policies designed to reduce their volume or to eliminate them. Political in-
sistence on such action can hardly be attributed to business cycle research,
but that research has had a decided influence on the types of policy that
have been considered or adopted. While it is now generally agreed that
business fluctuations are inherent in the capitalistic process, it is also agreed
that the excesses of inflation or deflation that actually occur have no con-
structive purpose whatever. Fluctuations in private investment may be
required to give effect to the irregular process of technological change and
adaptation to it; but they also give rise to 'multiplier' and 'acceleration'
effects which may account for the bulk of the business cycle.
This distinction between primary and secondary effects leads some to
hope it may be possible to devise policies that will remove the secondary
consequences and leave the capitalistic process not only unimpaired but
improved. On the other hand, the same analysis leads others to the view
that the sole way to cure the ills arising from the business cycle is to abolish
it. They therefore recommend that the economy be kept in a state of con-
tinued inflationary pressure, held in by direct allocatiqn and price controls.
With such a policy a decline in activity in one sector of the economy can be
compensated by relaxation of the restraints on another. This is essentially
the type of full employment policy followed in several European countries
at present. While such a policy can be relied on to eliminate the business
cycle, it remains to be seen whether it will kill the capitalist goose.
The policy of the United States has so far been directed toward abate-
ment of the rigors of the business cycle, and in this paper I shall discuss the
possibility of action in that direction.
Policies designed to reduce the extent of business fluctuations can hardly
fail to affect the equilibrium or trend values about which the economy
fluctuates. In what follows we shall therefore be concerned with the con-
tributior, that economic research has made or can make to both these
aspects of public policy.
Stabilization policy can lead to three categories of government action:
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1) Measures to bring about institutional or structural changes in the pri-
vate economy itself. Put formally this means changes in parameters of the
structural equations determining the behavior of the private economy.
Once the change is accomplished it is hoped that the private economy will
function more effectively without further government intervention.
2) Measures to provide government control over endogenous variables in
the private economy where such control is needed for stabilization pur-
poses. This category cannot be clearly distinguished from (1). Suppose
the government were to assume temporary control over the price of steel.
That action may be described either in terms of controlling the variable
or as substituting a new structural relation for the old one. I use the term
'controlling the variable' to denote cases where government action on an
ad hoc basis within the period of the business cycle is contemplated.
3) Measures to compensate changes in the private economy through the
government's conduct of its own program, particularly in the budgetary
and monetary fields. This type of action involves public control of variables
exogenous to the private economy.
To illustrate the distinction between these categories, consider the ques-
tion of reducing fluctuations in inventories. A tax measure that penalized
speculative inventory transactions would represent a structural change.
Direct action to limit inventory holdings, as was taken during the war,
would involve control over variables in the private economy. Finally, gov-
ernment purchase or sale of inventories for stabilization purposes would
be a type of compensatory action.
While measures within each category are probably required to achieve
stability there is considerable freedom of choice as to the type of control
that is attempted —asthe inventory example illustrates. The possibility
of choice raises difficult questions from the viewpoint of economic analysis.
To what extent should the adoption of a control device be governed by the
definiteness with which its economic consequences can be predicted? Is it
good public policy to vest in the government discretionary economic pow-
ers where economic analysis cannot provide satisfactory guides for their
use? Do the admitted defects in the operation of the private economy them-
selves warrant government intervention where the effects of that interven-
tion can be, at best, imperfectly foreseen?
2 INSTITUTIONAL OR STRUCTURAL CHANGE
Measures to increase the propensity to consume furnish a good example of
proposals to alleviate depressions through structural changes in the pri-
vate economy. During the '3 0's especially it was held that if the government
shifted the burden of taxation from low to high incomes and increased
taxes on corporate incomes, the propensity to consume out of personalCYCLE ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY 407
incomes would be increased, so that the need to resort to government
deficits to cure depressions would be reduced.
This view, so widely, held a decade ago, is now open to serious question
even by many of its former adherents. Some of the reasons for doubt are:
1) There is now considerable doubt whether the marginal propensity to
consume among income groups varies nearly as much as the average pro-
pensity, and the argument for redistributive taxation depends on large
differences among marginal propensities.
2) It is now realized that consumption by loWer income groups may depend
on the consumption of higher income groups. If so, greater equality of
incomes may actually reduce consumption out of a given national income
rather than increase it.
3) Recent experience has again demonstrated that corporate profits and
savings are highly sensitive to changes in national income and prices. Cor-
porations in the aggregate run surpluses in good times and deficits in bad,
and thus cushion the impact of cyclical change. It may be preferable to
leave this flexibility in the private economy rather than ,transfer it to the
government revenue system by increasing taxes on corporate profits.
4) Under the influence of the General Theory, many economists over-
looked the possibility that the supply of particular kinds of savings, notably
corporate savings, might have a pronounced effect on the rate of invest-
ment. And, more generally, in the spirit of the '3 0's, many economists
believed that it was possible to manipulate the propensity to consume
without effecting inducements and incentives to invest. This belief com-
mands far less support today.
We would run into even more serious difficulty in attempting to predict
the effect of structural changes bearing directly on incentives to invest. We
have no definitive economic analysis of the 'effects on business cycles of
measures to reduce monopoly or to remove rigidities in the price system.
Other difficult examples come readily to mind. Estimates of the quantita-
tive effects of proposed structural changes are still hardly more than a
gleam in the econometrician's eye.
Nevertheless, economic analysis can furnish useful qualitative judg-
ments. There can hardly be any doubt that the adoption of deposit insur-
ance and mortgage relief were useful and constructive steps. Placing the
personal income tax on a current basis can be applauded as a step toward
stability. Our present knowledge does, I believe, enable us to 'tell whether
important structural changes will add to the stability of the economic sys-
tem. Unfortunately, many measures that promote stability may also lower
the average level at which the economy operates or slow down the rate of
economic progress, and, inversely, a higher average level of operation may
be won at the cost of greater instability. But, as a practical rule, more408 PARTTHREE
uncertainties on one side should not weigh heavily against the prospect of
real improvements on the other.
Of course, institutional and structural changes in the economy will occur
for political and social reasons. Is the economist to stand on the sidelines
because business cycle research has so far led to inconclusive results? I do
not mean to imply that at all. Surely we can expect that the economist can
improve on the result that would be reached by the layman without his
advice. But I believe the number of proposals for change that can be
justified from the business cycle point of view alone is very limited.
3 DIRECT CONTROL OVER ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
The Spence Bill (H.R. 2756), proposed in the present session of Congress,
reflects a type of thinking that was very prominent in NRA days and still
has strong support in official circles. The Bill would give the President
wide power to fix prices, allocate materials, and increase productive capac-
ity either through encouragement and assistance to private enterprise or,
where necessary, through direct government action. Such controls are held
to be needed from time to time to correct specific maladjustments of prices
or quantities that impede continued prosperity. Although there seems to
be no likelihood that the Spence Bill will be passed in the present economic
circumstances, it represents the approach that is frequently used by the
President's Council of Economic Advisers and is likely to have strong
appeal in the face of political demands that the government 'take deter-
mined action'.
Even without a legislative mandate, the government cannot or does not
avoid control of major variables. The relation of wages to prices, of agri-
cultural to industrial prices, and the behavior over time of particular prices
are all held to have their effects on economic stability; and the government
exhorts business, labor, and agriculture to achieve 'proper' price relation-
ships and to avoid 'maladjustments'. To what extent can economic analysis
provide a basis for judgment on these matters?
Increases in money wages are frequently urged as a means of increasing
mass consumer purchasing power, thereby avoiding depressions or pro-
moting prosperity. To assess the merits of this argument we need to know
the effects of money wage increases on prices, profit margins, and invest-
ment decisions. I know of no economic analysis that can provide conclu-
sive answers on these essential points.
The effects of changes on the relation of agricultural to industrial prices
is still a matter for dispute. It can be argued that higher agricultural prices
increase the ability of farmers to purchase industrial products and that
lower agricultural prices increase the ability of the industrial population to
purchase their own products. Which of these influences is stronger shouldCYCLE ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY 409
be within the power of statistical research to determine, but we do not yet
know the answer.
The official attitude toward particular price increases produced the
recent episode of 'industrial statesmanship' and its concomitant, the gray
market. There is at least as much to be said against that policy as for it.
Nevertheless, business cycle research raises a strong presumption that
things may go wrong because of price and wage maladjustments. Is there
any reason to prefer the errors that result from the operation of the market
to those that come from government intervention? I believe there is on the
ground that business is better able to protect itself against the vagaries of
the price system than those of government action.
There may, however, be clear-cut cases where economic analysis can
justify control of economic variables. Subsequent events have thoroughly
justified the view held by many economists at the end of the war that
restrictions on nonresidential building should have been continued until
the demand for residential building had eased. Such action would have
diminished inflationary pressure after the war and might well have pro-
vided support for the economy at present.
Direct control of inventory accumulation, industry by industry, may
prove to be the only effective way of removing of the most serious
economic instabilities. But I do not believe that these controls should
depend on current diagnosis of the business cycle. They should aim rather
at maintaining certain fixed relations, for instance, a fixed ratio of inven-
tories to output. Such a policy would be designed to restrict inventory
accumulations to production needs and thereby to eliminate speculation.
As another example, it may prove feasible for the government to get
well established industries, such as the railroads, to adopt long-term invest-
ment programs that would be carried out regardless of current business
conditions.
These illustrations of possible uses of controls depend on my belief that
we do have enough knowledge of the business cycle to warrant attempts
to eliminate sources of instability, but far greater diagnostic skill is required
to correct 'maladjustments' during the course of the cycle.
4 CONTROL OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES —COMPENSATORYACTION
A Fiscal and Monetary Measures
Under this heading I include government expenditure and revenue pro-
grams designed to offset fluctuations in the private economy and central
control of money and credit to the same end.
Business cycle analysis fully warrants compensatory fiscal action to
remove the secondary deflation. There is no useful purpose to be served
by permitting an autonomous decline in expenditures on, say, industrial410 PART THREE
equipment, housing, or business durables to spread to the rest of the
economy. Under ideal conditions, tax payments or transfer payments
would be varied to maintain consumers' purchasing power.
The difficult questions arise when we consider more refined types of
compensatory action. Should the primary changes themselves be compen-
sated? Should a decline in private housing be offset by an increase in public
housing? Should a decrease in business expenditures on capital equipment
be offset by construction of, say, public power projects? Or should a decline
in investment be offset by an increase in consumption?
There are obvious difilculties with any scheme of full compensation
owing to the immobility of productive factors from place to place or from
industry to industry. There are less obvious cases where the correct action
depends on the economic diagnosis of the causes of the decline in private
activity. If a decline in private housing results from high construction
costs, the public housing program may keep up costs and prevent needed
adjustments. A program of temporary compensation may then give way
to one of permanent governjnent support for the housing industry. Similar
problems arise when we consider the question of stabilizing total invest-
ment expenditures. Unless government investment is complementary to
private investment, rather than competitive with it, attempts to prolong
prosperity by public works may also prolong the underlying causes of
depression.
The difficulties of compensatory action increase when we turn to the
question of recovering from a depression rather than maintaining pros-
perity. Fiscal policy from 1933 to 1937 certainly did not raise the Amer-
ican economy to a state of stable prosperity, and there is no evidence that
we now have the ability to do better in the future.
In the present state of economic knowledge, I think fiscal policy should
aim chiefly at limiting undesirable increases or decreases in total purchas-
ing power rather than at stabilizing particular sectors of the economy. This,
of course, means accepting a more limited objective than complete sta-
bilization for the time being, but improvements in our qualitative and
quantitative analysis should permit refinements in the
The effects of changes in monetary policy are more difficult to appraise
than those of fiscal policy which has a direct impact on the income stream.
The econometric studies of Tinbergen and Klein conclude that monetary
influences have not been important in the periods studied. Nevertheless,
I doubt the validity of these results. Obviously, a sufficiently restrictive
monetary policy could precipitate a depression and a sufficiently expansive
one could increase the rates of consumption and investment. With the
national debt at its present size, even moderate changes in interest rates
may have marked effects. In the absence of a definitive economic analysis,CYCLE ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY 411
the official attitude seems to be to prefer relative stability of interest rates
to plunging into the unknown.
B The Question of Forecasting
Any economic policy decision involves some kind of prognosis. Even pro-
vision of relief for people already unemployed involves an assumption that
the unemployment will continue, or better, that it would be dangerous to
assume that it will not. Action to correct demonstrated maladjustments of
the kind discussed above would have to be justified on the grounds that
they will not cure themselves. Structural changes should be based on the
view that the structural defects in the system that they are designed to
remove will continue to be important. But the question of our ability to
forecast cyclical change arises in explicit form when compensatory policies
are considered.
If highly accurate forecasts of the course of the private economy could
be made, they would provide the basis for compensatory action. But fore-
casts of the required degree of accuracy are not available.
The Cowles Commission results represent the extent to which business
cycle analysis has provided a forecasting device.' Klein gives confidence
intervals for forecasts based on his model (see p. 118), and they are obvi-
ously too wide to provide for government action. In many cases it would
be impossible to tell from the forecasts whether the outlook should be
considered to be deflationary or inflationary. Even the calculated confi-
dence intervals depend on the assumptions that the price level and private
investment are known; that other disturbances are randomly distributed;
and that there are no errors of observation in the basic time series. The real
confidence intervals are much wider than those given.
The most promising approach to forecasting seems to be through the
direct investigation of investment and consumption intentions. But this
approach too is in an embryonic state from the viewpoint of its practical
usefulness.
At present, I believe that some simple autoregressive device would be
as satisfactory as any method. Apart from the possibility of abrupt changes
in government policy, such as large changes in the defense program, it is
probable we would do as well simply to assume that the present state of
affairs will continue as to attempt to predict change. Or we might use
Orcutt's formula:2
(1)
1L.R. Klein, The Use of Econometric Models as a Guide to Economic Policy,
Econometrica, April 1947, p. 111.
2G.H. Orcutt and S. F. James, Testing the Significance of Correlation Between Time
Series, Biometrika, XXXV, Part III and IV, December 1948.412 PART THREE
where Y is the national income or any other economic variable andis a
random term. Orcutt has found that this autoregressive pattern character-
ized many observed time series in the interwar period. It seems sensible,
in the light of our general economic knowledge, to assume, as the formula
does, that change in the most recently observed direction will continue at
a reduced rate. If the situation has been changing, it is reasonable to assume
that change will continue; and, since business cycles do have turning points,
it seems reasonable to assume that the rate of change will decrease. If no
change has taken place in the recent past, there seems no good grounds for
assuming that change will commence without specific information to that
effect.3
Since the regular budget process requires planning for a year or more
in advance, there is need for shorter-run compensatory devices. One possi-
bility is to introduce 'formula flexibility' by providing for changes in expen-
diture items or tax rates depending on some autoregressive formula applied
to monthly indexes of production or employment.
Some important government expenditure programs, such as unemploy-
ment compensation or farm price support, vary automatically with income
and employment. The progressiveness of the income tax makes tax yields
vary more than proportionately to income. Such programs act as auto-
matic stabilizers, and from the viewpoint of controlling the business cycle,
there are strong arguments for adopting them more widely.
Apart from its value as a forecast, a simple autoregressive formula
provides the government with a useful strategic assumption on which to
base its policy. A strategic assumption differs from a forecast in that it is
based in part on what happens if things do not turn out as planned. It is
thus analogous to the saddle point in the theory of games.
Assuming Orcutt's formula is accepted as the best available forecasting
device, how should it be modified to serve as a satisfactory strategic as-
sumption? It seems unlikely that it would serve any useful purpose to go
outside the limits of assuming that next year's value of Y will equal this
year's on the one side and that recent changes in Y will continue Un-




In a mild inflationary situation, there may be more danger in going too
At first sight, this formula may seem open to serious objection because it will never
forecast a turning point. But it may work well everywhere except at turning points;
and more complicated forecasting methods have been notoriously unsuccessful in
predicting turning points of the busmess cycle.CYCLE ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY 413
far with anti-inflationary measures than not going far enough, since going
too far may precipitate a depression. In that event it would be desirable to
modify the best forecast, (1), in the direction of the limit, (2), and to use
a coefficient for the rate of change term of less than .3. On the other hand,
in a depression the risks of doing too little in the way of anti2deflation may
be considered greater than the risks of doing too much. In that event one
would modify the best forecast in the direction of (3) and use a coefficient
greater than .3 as the basis for action.
It follows from these examples that the appropriate strategic assumption
might diverge from the best forecast in different ways depending on the
phase of the business cycle, other economic and political circumstances.
An autoregressive method conforms well to practical requirements.
Governments are naturally reluctant to base their actions on forecasts
unsupported by clear evidence that the layman can understand. He can
understand a projection of an existing rate of change, or the projection of
the present level of a variable where there is no clear evidence of change.
On the other hand, governments are now chary of predicting that pros-
perity is 'around the corner', and it may be inexpedient, on purely eco-
nomic grounds, to predict a depression that might not occur, since govern-
ments must pay attention to the expectations they create.
In this paper I have dwelt largely on the limitations of business cycle analy-
sis from the viewpoint of public policy; and consequently have paid no
tribute to the skill, patience, and imagination that have gone into business
cycle research. Despite these efforts, knowledge of the business cycle is still
a scarce resource. From the viewpoint of both public policy and research
that resource should not be dissipated. But I believe that policies that
make full use of the knowledge we do have, and at the same time recognize
its limitations, can produce a high degree of economic stability.
COMMENT
T. M. CLARK, Columbia University
Harking back to Mr. Haberler's paper, I wonder if I am correctly inter-
preting its purport in the proposition that a 'planned economy' can be
expected to do better at stabilizing cycles than the kind of economy we
have — one may call it —notbecause of its planning (in which414 PART THREE
it is inferior) but because of other features of its system. That is, after its
forecasts and plans have gone wrong, it will take prompter and more ade-
quate compensatory action than our kind of modified private-enterprise
system will do. I suspect this is probably right; and that, accordingly, the
emphasis on 'planning' in discussions of the subject is misleading.
Coming to Mr. Smithies' paper, I am in such general agreement with the
trend of his thinking that I am afraid my comments will not be particularly
exciting. I 'shall not quarrel with his classification, though the distinctions
puzzle me a bit; and I hope there may be, on the whole, less doubt about
the effect of key measures than about the pigeon-hole in which they should
be classified. In that connection, I note that when, in these discussions,
'qualitative' knowledge of the effects of policies has been contrasted with
quantitative, 'qualitative' seems to refer to knowledge of the direction of
change brought about by the policy in question in the quantitative variables
on which the discussion seems to center. A full scale qualitative discussion
would go much farther afield.
With regard to the question of shifting the distribution of disposable
income in the direction of greater equality, for the purpose of increasing
consumer spending, the main effect of such measures would seem to be
noncyclical, and any incidental cyclical effect they might have does not
seem to have been clearly brought out. In that connection, you are prob-
ably familiar with Mr. Lubell's study, and my comments on jt.1 My own
shorthand estimate was in the form that it would take a shifting of five
dollars, or nearly five dollars, of income from richer to poorer groups, to
increase consumer spending by one dollar, assuming total income remained
unchanged. The effect on total spending would include a plus or minus
effect on investment spending. In my further rough estimate of how far
the equalization process could go before the minus would outweigh the
plus, I guessed the practicable increase in total spending, from a given
total income, to be about 1 per cent. That answer would naturally depend
on how far a country had already gone toward equalization. Cyclical trans-
fer payments of an expansionary sort are, of course, a different matter.
I am interested in Mr. Smithies' further proposition that consumption
by lower income groups may depend on that of higher income groups.
The only instances I can think of offhand seem to be noncyclical, and I
would be glad to give Mr. Smithies part of my time to elaborate.
Next, as to the kinds of controls included in the Spence Bill; one under-
stands what they might do to resist inflation; their effect in stabilizing
cycles or mitigating persistent depression is dimly glimpsed through the
1H.Lubell, Effects of Income Redistribution on Consumer's Expenditures, American
Economic Review, March 1947, pp. 157-70; A Correction, ibid., December 1947,
p. 930, and my note on p. 931.CYCLE ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY 415
foggy atmosphere that surrounds the concept of 'maladjustments'. In the
interest of clarity, I propose a tax on the use of this term unaccompanied
by explicit definition of what is meant. It would not raise much revenue,
but would be a disincentive tax. The same would apply to the opposite-
number concept, that of the delicate balance of correct adjustment which
has figured so prominently in statements of the President's Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers.
As to the kindred question of the effects of wage increases on total eco-
nomic activIty, I heartily agree that "I know of no economic analysis that
can provide conclusive answers. ..." Thisincludes such theorising as I
have myself attempted on the subject.
In passing, I note the suggestion of maintaining a fixed ratio of inven-
tories to output. If that is the best that can be aimed at, it should be noted
that it introduces a built-in acceleration factor.
Turning to compensatory action, I hope it would not be necessary to
decide whether to compensate secondary movements only, or primary
also, since I do not see how one is to distinguish one from the other as they
are merged in the actual, ex post, fluctuations of housing construction or
other investment. This may furnish a text, or pretext, for stressing the point
that results in this field cannot be neatly divided into percentages, assign-
able to different causes and the sum of the percentages equaling 100.
Causation is a joint resultant of an indefinite number of active and condi-
tioning variables. In maintaining purchasing power, it is never safe to
forget that the desired effect may be facilitated or obstructed by the other
accompanying conditions; it may sustain employment or be dissipated in
price inflation.
A neglected phase of this subject seems to be the implications of the
idea of compensatory action that would completely remove a secondary
deflation. The 'built-in' dampeners are necessarily partial in their action;
and the deliberate, timed compensators (like changes in tax rates) neces-
sarily allow a recession to get started before they come into action. Under
these circumstances, what are the implications of 100 per cent maintenance
of consumer buying power? There are some unemployed; and I assume
we cannot afford to pay them as much for not working as they got for
working. Instead of eliminating unemployment, that would presumably
convert a lot of involuntary unemployment into voluntary. This could be
handled by a state that does not mind conscripting labor, but a liberal state
is debarred from that answer. Nevôrtheless, it might be driven close to that
answer, by a side door, through being forced to become hard-boiled in
applying the principle that a worker forfeits his claim to benefits if he
refuses a reasonable offer of a job.
So we may assume the incomes of the unemployed would shrink. Then416 PART THREE
if total income is to be maintained, it is ir1escapable that some other dis-
posable incomes should be increased;' not those that need it most and not
because of anything the recipients have done to create or to deserve it, but
simply because there is a recession to be compensated. It is a quaint idea,
and I do not know that this implication of the concept of complete compen-
sation has been explicitly examined. It seems to deserve pretty searching
examination if we are to undertake policies that promise complete compen-
sation of secondary fluctuation in income.
A similar conclusion appears when one examines the implications of
complete stabilization of construction, via counter-cyclical timing of public
works.2 This would introduce an artificial reverse cycle in some branches
of construction and some types of materials. And I would attach consider-
able importance to the danger Smithies mentionsof supporting unduly
high construction costs and prices, which should be brought down rather
than supported by an unconditionally guaranteed demand.3 Removal of
such structural defects may not in itself be enough to stabilise the economy,
but failure to remove them may be a serious handicap to other stabilization
policies.
To sum up, Smithies seems to combine judicious skepticism with a tem-
perate degree of optimism that limited objectives may be attainable.
2SeeJulius Margolis, Public Works and Economic Stability, Journal of Political
Economy, August 1949, pp. 293-303.
Cf. Wesley C. Ballaine, How Government Purchasing Procedures Strengthen
Monopoly Elements, ibid., December 1943, pp. 538-46.
LEONID HURWICZ, University of Illinois
1) Smithies' objective is to examine the contribution of economic analysis
to the alleviation of business fluctuations. He classifies the different possible
policies, appraises their merits, points out the limitations, and ends on a
note of qualified optimism with regard to the potentialities inherent in the
inteffigent use of existing knowledge.
2) The purpose of this note is to consider some of the postulates on which
an appraisal such as that by Smithies must be based. It is not that Smithies'
conclusions are unpalatable, indeed most of them are eminently reason-
able. It appears essential, however, that some of the hidden underlying
assumptions (including certain value judgments) be brought into the open
if policy discussion is to be anything more than a statement of faith.
3) Perhaps the most fundamental assumption inherent in the present sta-
bilization discussion is that community action is (or, at least, might con-
ceivably be) desirable for the purpose of remedying economic ills; and
that, in particular, policy problems must be considered already at theCYCLE ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY 417
present, admittedly inadequate, stage of our knowledge concerning the
'mechanism' (causal structure) of economic fluctuations. The alternative
viewpoints, not inexistent I think, would be (a) our knowledge is too scant
for us even to consider public policy in this field, and (b) no matter what
our state of knowledge, things should be permitted to follow their 'natural'
course.
4) Granting that community action should be considered as conceivably
advisable, the choice will depend on the precise objectives of such action.
How can one determine these objectives? The viewpoint often adopted in
welfare economics (Pareto type) is that the economist qua economist
should concern himself only with objectives capable of securing an unam-
mous vote by the whole population (the compensation principle). As I
understand his paper, Smithies avoids this issue and, essentially, formu-
lates a preference schedule of his own concerning alternative states of the
economy. His utility function decreases with the amplitude of business
fluctuations and increases with the 'trend values' —withrelatively heavy
weight attached to the It presumably depends also on such things
as the extent to which the adopted policies would be
5)Evenwhen the economist's utility function is given, there remains the
fundamental difficulty of seeing into the future. The merits of a policy must
be evaluated in terms of what is likely to happen if the policy is adopted
versus what might happen if the policy is not adopted. This is, essentially,
the task of forecasting the future on two (or more) alternative assump-
tions. Smithies raises this problem of predictability in his introduction
and also devotes to it Section 4B (The Question of Forecasting)Clearly,
the economist's dilemma is that of having to choose under circumstances
of uncertainty or even complete ignorance with regard to the likelihood of
events whose occurrence is to determine the consequences of the policies
involved. The statement that the existing margin of uncertainty is unsatis-
factorily large3 points to the desirability of further research, but does not
relieve us of the need for choice.4
""... moreuncertainties on one side should not weigh heavily against the prospect
of real improvements on the other."
lb"Isit good public policy to vest in the government discretionary economic powers
where economic analysis cannot provide satisfactory guides for their use?"
2"Towhat extent should the adoption of a control device be governed by the defi-
niteness with which its economic consequences can be predicted?" "Do the admitted
defects in the operation of the private economy themselves warrant government
intervention where the effects of intervention can be, at best imperfectly foreseen?"
"Klein gives confidence intervals for forecasts based on his model ... andthey
are obviously too wide to provide for government action."
'It may be, of course, that if the margin of uncertainty is very wide, governmental
non-interference is the best possible choice, but this need not necessarily be so.418 PART THREE
Assuming that no additional knowledge can be acquired before the
choice is to be made, the problem becomes one of a 'rational' criterion to
be used in choosing under incomplete information. One such criterion has
been proposed by the authors of the Theory of Games: that of choosing
the action under which the 'worst'5 that can happen is better than under
any alternative choice of action. This 'minimax principle' is an example, by
no means unique, of a criterion for choice under incomplete information.
To answer some of the questions raised by Smithies we must first com-
mit ourselves to a choice of criterion, whether it be the minimax principle
or something else, and find out what action the selected criterion recom-
mends. It is clear that two individuals possessing the same information
and characterized by the same utility function (say with regard to 'sta-
bility' versus 'trend value') might choose different policies if they follow
different criteria (e.g., minimax versus maximax) for choice under incom-
plete information.
6) Whether the economist's policy goals are merely his general ones or
are meant to express the 'desires of the community', it must be taken into
account that, while the government is attempting to carry out the policy,
a good deal of freedom will be left to the individual units (consumers,
entrepreneurs, labor unions, banks, etc.).
Such a unit is primarily motivated by its own objectives (individual
utility maximization) and its decisions are based to a considerable extent
on the expectations of future actions of the government.6 More precisely,
the public, i.e., the aggregate of the individual units, follows a rule of
behavior dependent on the (subjective) information available to it. For
instance, it might be that the public's behavior is expressible in terms of
the minimax principle.
The situation is clearly reminiscent of that encountered in the theory of
strategic games and suggests the possibility of analogous solutions. In
particular, an argument can be put forward in favor of 'mixed' (ran-
domized) strategies.7 The latter, in principle, eliminate the discretionary
element in the government's action without giving the public advance
information that might be used for defeating the government's policies.8
Also, in principle at least, the public's confidence in the success of the poli-
cies ceases to be a necessary condition for the success itself. (The latter
assertion corresponds to the fact that the 'player' following an optimal
As measured by the mathematical expectation of utility.
'Government' as used here includes the Federal Reserve System, etc.
It is my view that such a solution has the political advantages of 'rules' in the 'rules
vs. authority' argument without sharing the destabilizing features of a system in
which all actions of the government would be completely predictable.
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strategy can count on realizing at least the 'value of the game' regardless
of the other 'player's' strategy. ) °
7) Smithies classifies the policies into three groups —structural,direct
control, and compensatory. (His terminology resembles, but is not equiva-
lent to, that used in some of the econometric literature.) Smithies' main
objection to the policies in the first two categories seems to be that, at the
present state of our knowledge, their consequences are more difficult to
predict than those in the third.1° My view is that the type of knowledge
needed to anticipate the effects of the 'compensatory' policies is essentially
the same as in the case of the 'direct controls' and that the more funda-
mental distinction lies in the way policies affect the freedom of action of
the individual consumer or entrepreneur. The 'structural' and 'direct con-
trol' policies tend to deprive some individuals of the rights previously exer-
cised, e.g., the right to free price setting or allocation of the budget dollar,
while the typical compensatory policies (especially government expendi-
tures or commodity purchases, banking activities, and sales) do not.'1
In terms of social values this is, of course, a very important factor affecting
the choice of policy type.
As for predictability, the only safe generalization would seem to be that
primary effects of a given policy are easier to foresee than the secondary
ones. In particular, there is nothing obvious about the effectiveness of the
'automatic stabilizers' as a class, once the possible changes in expecta-
tions are taken into account.
Other principles of policy classification may be of interest. In particular,
policies differ with respect to the extent to which they regulate the separate
sectors of the economy. Thus we have monetary policy at one extreme,
price and output control (as in wartime) at the other. The latter, as
Smithies points out, are likely to interfere with the natural equilibrating
(and optimizing) process; but is not the same true of the inventory con-
trols, considered by Smithies in a rather favorable light?
8) I share Smithies' view that prognosis is always present in policy making,
as well as his conviction that the forecasting tools at present available are
very unsatisfactory. The concept of the 'strategic assumption' is also use-
It is important to recall that the 'value' is the mathematical expectation of the play-
er's utility. Those who object to the measurable utility postulates, on which such an
approach is based, may prefer to think in terms of minimaxing utility rather than its
mathematical expectation. It should be borne in mind, however, that the 'guaranteed
value' will appear lower.
Smithiesdoes cite counter examples in both directions.
Variationsin the level of compulsory transfers (taxes, subsidies) seem to form an
intermediate category in this respect. They touch the individual directly but do not
necessarily restrict his rights.420 PART THREE
ful,12 as is the 'slanting' of forecasts in the direction that will lead to a less
risky policy.
Where I part company with Smithies is in his choice of the Orcutt for-
mula as a basis for prediction. The reasons are partly of a technical nature
and those will not be given here. What must, however, be pointed out is
that the Orcutt formula is of no help in the following fundamental type of
problem: what is the probable difference in the level of national income
on alternative assumptions with regard to the policies to be adopted by the
government? (Klein's equations, with their wide confidence intervals and
dependence on the assumptions to be made concerning certain variables,
do provide an answer. )13
'21nthe language of the theory of games the 'strategic assumption' on the part of
player X concerning Y's strategy is the assumption that Y will adopt an optimal
strategy.
"So does the traditional variety of theorizing in terms of assuming the signs of
various elasticities, etc.
CARL CHRIST, Cowles Co,nmission for Research in Economics
Smithies has said correctly that if a change occurs in one of the structural
parameters in an econometric model, we shall often know only the direc-
tion of the change, not its magnitude. He concludes that it is uneconomical
to put much effort into determining accurately the values of the structural
parameters. The intuitive argument is illustrated by an example: it is fool-
ish to measure one distance to within a thousandth of an inch if it is going
to be added to another that contains an error of a foot or two. Similarly,
Smithies argues that in evaluating the effect of a change in a structural para-
meter, when we know only the direction of the change and not its magni-
tude, we cannot get a quantitative answer, so it is not necessary to have
accurate knowledge of any of the parameters.
I wish to point out that in some cases of change in an important variable
induced by a change in some structural parameter, the direction of the
effect cannot be told from a knowledge solely of the direction of the initial
change in the parameter in question —inthese cases it is frequently neces-
sary to know also the values (or at least upper and lower bounding values)
of certain other parameters in the system. This is becausethe derivative of
any variable with respect to any parameter (i.e., the ratio of the resulting
change in the variable to the initial change in the parameter, for small
changes) is given by a ratio of two determinants that depend upon struc-
tural parameters, and the sign of a determinant cannot be found in general
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For example, we may know that an enlarged social security program
will increase the marginal propensity to consume. Consider the effect upon
income of this increase in the marginal propensity to consume, a, in the
following simple model, where Y =realincome, Creal consumption,
I =realinvestment, and Greek letters are parameters:
C
c+I— Y=0










Thus we see that in order to tell in this model whether an increase in the
marginal propensity to consume will increase income, we have to know
whether the sum a +isless than 1.
Even without estimating a andwemay know or believe for other
reasons (such as the fact of the stability of the system) that a +<1 in
this case, but in more complicated cases such a priori knowledge is insuffi-
cient, and it becomes necessary to estimate some or all of the other para-
meters in order to find the direction of change of income in response to an
increase in the given parameter. An illustrative example follows, in which
a parameter of the tax system is changed. Variables are consumption C,
investment I, wage income W, profit income P, national income Y, inter-
est rate r, taxes on wage income TW, and taxes on profit income T", all in422 PART THREE
deflated dollars except r. Greek letters denote parameters,being a func-









Thefourth equation determines total taxes (TW + as a function of
national income Y, and the third determines the share to be borne by wage
earners as a function of wage income W; thus a rise in the parameter
represents a shift of the tax burden from entrepreneurs to wage earners.
By the same process as was used in the previous example, we obtain
(1—8) +—1
Itis not possible to deduce the signthis expression from the usual a
1,sothatin
order to determine the sign of it is necessary to estimate certain
parameters.